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LATER PATENTS AS PRIOR ART
"Whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented inven-
tion... infringes the patent' and may be sued for doing so. He, in turn,
may defend on the statutory ground that the patent is invalidV Under
the statute,3 the defendant may use other patents, called reference patents,
to invalidate the patent in suit if these reference patents negative any of
the "conditions for patentability" which are listed in part II of the statute.'
In determining the defensive competence of any of the possible reference
patents, the defendant must consider a number of factors: what is dis-
1. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964). Unless otherwise indicated, here-
after all citations to statute sections are to 35 U.S.C. (1964).
2. The popularity of this defense is evidenced by the fact that approximately 50%
of the patents whose validity has been questioned in court have been found invalid. 41
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 291 (1959).
3. The section of the Patent Act relating to defenses reads as follows:
§ 282. Presumption of validity; defenses
A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in inde-
pendent or dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity
of other claims; dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent
upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting it.
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringe.
ment of a patent and shall be pleaded:(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability,(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in
part II of this title as a condition for patentability,(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title,(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
In actions involving the validity or infringement of a patent the party asserting
invalidity or noninfringement shall give notice in the pleadings or otherwise in
writing to the adverse party at least thirty days before the trial, of the country,
number, date, and name of the patentee of any patent, the title, date, and page
numbers of any publication to be relied upon as anticipation of the patent in suit
or, except in actions in the United States Court of Claims, as showing the state
of the art, and the name and address of any person who may be relied upon as
the prior inventor or as having prior knowledge of or as having previously used
or offered for sale the invention of the patent in suit. In the absence of such
notice proof of the said matters may not be made at the trial except on such
terms as the court requires. As amended (Supp. 1965).
The defenses enumerated under subsection (3) relate to indefiniteness in the dis-
closure of the invention in the patent specification and to reissue of defective patents.
Thus, the only section under which the effect of other patents on the validity of the
patent in suit becomes an issue is § 282(2). The relevant sections of part II of the
statute are §§ 101, 102, and 103.
4. The term "conditions for patentability" is unfortunate. The "conditions" set out
in §§ 102 and 103 are in fact conditions for non-patentability. If any of the conditions
listed in these sections is shown to exist, an inventor is not entitled to a patent on his
invention. The terminology used herein is based on the construction that these con-
ditions represent positive conditions for patentability, so as to conform with the titles
of the sections rather than with their actual arrangement.
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closed in the specification and drawings of the reference patent, what is
claimed, to whom it was issued, and certain critical dates. These dates are
the date the reference patent was applied for and when it was issued. If
the reference patent was applied for before, but issued after, the applica-
tion date of the patent in suit, the reference patent is known as a "copend-
ing patent."5 The status of copending patents as references has been the
subject of considerable concern, both before and since the enactment of
the present statute.0
This note will consider the competence of a copending patent applied
for before the patent in suit, but issued after the issuance of the patent in
suit. It will not be concerned with the case in which both patents are to
the same person. In that situation, the rule against double patenting is
the only bar applicable. Under this rule the later patent may not be a bar
to an earlier one to the same inventor Therefore, this note will consider
only the case in which the later-issued patent is to a different inventor.
Under the present statute a copending patent to another is a valid
reference against an application not only for what it claims, but for what
it discloses.' The same is true of a prior-issued copending patent to another
when raised as a defense in an infringement suit.9 When, however, the
patent sought to be raised as a defense in not only a copending patent but
5. Virtually every writer in the field of copending patents has noted the ambiguity
of the term. The earliest seems to have been Commissioner of Patents Newton in Ex
parte Thomas, 251 O.G. Pat. Off. 839 (1918). As used herein, the term "copending
patent" refers to a patent applied for before, but granted after, the application date
of the patent or application in issue, regardless of the identity of the patentee of the
copending patent.
6. The most frequently discussed problem was whether that which is shown, but
not claimed, in a copending patent to another inventor is competent defensive material
if what is shown is not identical with the invention claimed by the later applicant.
This question has at last been resolved by the Supreme Court. Hazeltine Research,
Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
7. The basic problems are discussed in Application of Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010-11,
1014-15 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See Palmer, Double Patenting and Patent Soliciting, 41 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y, 458, 462 (1959); Rosenberg, Double Patenting, 45 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y, 34 (1963).
The rule is that an inventor cannot patent the same invention twice. Since the inven-
tion patented is that which is described by the claims of the patent, the claims must be
compared to see whether they describe the "same" invention. What constitutes the
"same" invention is the basic question of the law of double patenting. For a carefully
reasoned analysis of the grounds on which double patenting might be found and a dis-
cussion of the earlier cases see E. STRINGHAM, DOUBLE PATENTING § 2860 (1933). The
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also later-issued," three questions are presented: (1) whether there are
sound reasons for treating a later-issued copending patent differently from
a prior-issued patent; (2) if so, to what extent a later-issued patent should
still be considered valid defensive material in a patent infringement suit;
(3) to what extent the courts have recognized a difference between prior-
issued and later-issued copending patents."
I. THE LAW BEFORE 1952
The present statute and the court decisions since its passage rely heavily
on the earlier statute and case law.
1. Statutory Defenses
Revised Statutes section 4920,12 the statute which provided defenses in
infringement suits from before the turn of the century until passage of
the present statute, had five defenses, two of which-the third and the
fourth-were relevant to copending patents. 3 These were generally de-
scribed by the courts as "description in the prior art,"'4 which was thought
10. The order of events in the situation considered can be set out as follows:
X files application disclosing invention A.
P files application claiming invention A.
P receives patent on invention A.
X receives patent.
We shall be concerned with the effect given a "later issued" copending patent (the
patent to X) in an infringement suit (on the patent to P).
11. The possibility that later-issued patents should be treated differently from prior-
issued patents seems to have been raised most clearly by Johnson, The Alexander Milburn
Co. vs. Davis-Bournonville Co., 8 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 413, 415, 419, 422 (1926). See Ex
parte Thomas, 251 O.G. PAT. OFF. 839, 841 (1918). See also Roth, Obviousness Under
Section 103, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 811, 824-25 (1965).
12. Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 2, 29 Stat. 692, as amended, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat.
1212 (1939).
13. Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 2, 29 Stat. 692, as amended, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat.
1212 (1939):
In any action for infringement the defendant may plead the general issue, and,
having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or his attorney thirty days before,
may prove on trial any one or more of the following special matters:
Thaird. That it has been patented or described in some printed publication prior to
his supposed invention thereof . . .or,
Fourth. That he was not the original and first inventor or discoverer of any ma-
terial and substantial part of the thing patented;
A ".knd in notices as to proof of previous invention, knowledge, or use of the thing
patented, the defendant shall state the names of the patentees and the dates of
their patents, and when granted, and the names and residences of the persons
alleged to have invented or to have had the prior knowledge of the thing pat-
ented ....
14. The third defense.
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to mean publication, and "prior inventorship,"' which was thought to
entail both conception and reduction to practice. The history of the
statute, however, seems to have been largely a losing battle by courts to
maintain a distinction between the two."6
2. Early Decisions
Commentators on the general problems of copending patents have
generally been content to write off the pre-1926 history of the courts'
treatment of copending patents as hopelessly confused.' Three cases in
this period, however, so presage the trends in the later law that they
should be discussed.'
The earliest of these casees, Sundh Elec. Co. v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., 9 was a patent infringement suit on a patent to Sundh. The
defendant introduced a patent to one Ihlder to show that Sundh was not
the first inventor. The respective critical dates of the two patents are typi-
cal of those which raise the problem under consideration:
June 10, 1902: Ihlder application for patent filed.
March 16, 1903: Sundh application filed.
July 14, 1903: Sundh patent issued.
October 20, 1903: Ihlder patent issued."0
The trial court had found that the Ihlder patent did not "anticipate" the
patent in suit because it was copending and later-issued, and hence "was
15. The fourth defense.
16. Compare Davis-Bournonville Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 297 Fed. 846
(S.D.N.Y. 1924), with Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390
(1926).
17. See, e.g., Dodds, The Anticipatory Competence of Copending Patents, 28 J. PAT.
OFF. Soo'y 238, 241 (1946).
18. Sundh Elec. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 198 Fed. 94 (2d Cir. 1912);
Lemley v. Dobson-Evans Co., 243 Fed. 391 (6th Cir. 1917); Ex parte Thomas, 251 O.G.
Pat. Off. 839 (1918). The first two cases are particularly interesting because they rep-
resent the lines of decisions in the Second and Sixth Circuits which led to the fateful
case of Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
The three cases are of special interest because of their use of the term "anticipation."
The cases did not use the term to refer solely to either of the defenses, but often used it
to mask a transition from one defense to the other.
19. 198 Fed. 94 (2d Cir. 1912).
20. The Ihlder patent is what has been denominated a later-issued copending patent.
The dates are somewhat atypical in that both applications were allowed so quickly by
the Patent Office. For an analysis of the present rate of applications through the Patent
office see, e.g., Milmore, Commentaria, Pendency of Patent Applications, 41 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 510 (1959). Some increase in the rate has been achieved by recent changes
in the Patent Office procedure, so the present rate is probably less than a median pen-
dency of over three years as indicated by Milmore.
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not of the prior art."'" The Second Circuit considered the trial court's
discussion to be limited to the third defense22 and, while affirming the cor-
rectness of its analysis of the third defense, determined that the fourth de-
fense, prior inventorship, should have been applied.23 The court found
that Ihlder both described and claimed the same invention claimed in the
Sundh patent, and could account for the failure of the Patent Office to
declare an interference "only on the theory of oversight."24
A Sixth Circuit case, Lemley v. Dobson-Evans Co.,2" held the patent in
suit invalid because of an earlier patent which showed the general ar-
rangement claimed, when that patent was taken together with two patents
which were copending with the patent in suit. The copending patents
showed the equivalence of the various means called for by the main refer-
ence patent. The court re-examined its position that "a patent, the filing
date of which antedated the filing date of the patent in suit, was, prima
facie, anticipatory" and decided to maintain it.2" The court concluded
at the outset that there was really no difference between the third defense
and the fourth, and thus treated both defenses as matters of pleading. 7
21. Sundh Elec. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 222 Fed. 334 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911), rev'd, 198 Fed. 94 (2d cir. 1912).
22. 198 Fed. at 96.
23. Id. at 97, 98. Other courts had recognized the distinction between the third de-
fense (disclosure in the prior art) and the fourth defense (prior inventorship) that in
the former a reference patent was effective only as of the date of issue, whereas in the
latter the application date could be relied upon. See Barnes Automatic Sprinkler Co. v.
Walworth Mfg. Co., 60 Fed. 605 (7th Cir. 1894); Diamond Drill & Mach. Co. v. Kelly
Bros., 120 Fed. 282, 287 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902).
24. 198 Fed. at 98. The court's analysis was:
In order to maintain this fourth defense it must, of course, appear that the in-
vention of the patent in suit and the invention of the prior application are the
same ....
M[The substantial invention of each patent is the invention set forth in the
claims when such claims are construed in the light of the specifications. We may
best compare the third claims of both patents.
Each of these claims reads with great precision upon the devices of both patents.
Since both were pending in the Patent Office at the same time, interference should
have been declared. Id. at 97-98.
25. 243 Fed. 391 (6th Cir. 1917).
26. Id. at 395.
27. The court said:
The patent statute ... catalogues five supposedly independent matters of defense,
and requires the pleading of those which are to be relied upon. The separation is
not analytically perfect; the last clause [b] of "third" seems to belong to "fifth,"
and since the patentee could not possibly be the first inventor of something that,
before his invention, had been patented to or described by another, the entire first
clause [a] of "third" seems quite unnecessary. However, we have to deal with the
statute as it is. Lemley v. Dobson-Evans Co., 243 Fed. 391, 395 (6th Cir. 1917).
The court supported its conclusion that if the invention was described by another then
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The third case, Ex parte Thomas, " represents a carefully reasoned analy-
sis of the problem of the anticipatory competence of copending patentsy
both in terms of the statute and the policy behind the statute. Although
the question decided was whether a patent should be granted, the discus-
sion was based on the third and fourth defenses in an infringement suit.29
It quickly disposed of the third defense by ruling that a copending patent
can not be an "anticipation" of an application because "knowledge of an
anticipating invention must be accessible to the public."3 The commis-
sioner then pointed out that the fourth defense would undoubtedly have
been met if the copending patent had claimed the invention.3 The require-
ment of reduction to practice was disposed of by holding that the filing
of an allowable application constitutes "constructive" reduction to prac-
tice." Therefore, if the copending patent describes but does not claim the
invention, and the patentee fails to claim the invention, the public suc-
the patentee could not be the first inventor by extending "the famliar [sic] Patent Office
rule, [that] the filing of an allowable application is a constructive reduction to practice"
to cover everything disclosed in the application. Id. at 396. This extension of the fiction
of constructive reduction to practice allowed the court to meet nicely the principles that
invention, to be complete, requires two steps, conception and reduction to practice, and
that a mere description is not a reduction to practice. (On the other hand, it does not
seem to lend much support to the broad pronouncement that the "entire first clause [a]
of 'third' seems quite unnecessary," unless the court also considered a description in a
printed publication a constructive reduction to practice.) See generally Willner, Origin
and Development of the Doctrine of Constructive Reduction to Practice, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 618 (1954). This much of the analysis is all that was really needed for the court
to conclude that disclosure of the invention in a copending patent to another would be
sufficient to show that the patentee of the patent in suit was not the first inventor. The
court cites several cases for this proposition, including the Sundh case. 243 Fed. at 396.
Once the court had concluded that there was no need for the third defense, it easily
inferred that since references cited under the third defense were combined to show
"anticipation," references cited under the fourth defense could also be combined. "Some
[of the cases cited contra] seem to depend upon a distinction between 'anticipation' and
'priority of invention,' applying the former name to the third defense and the latter
to the fourth, though we do not see why 'anticipation' is not properly applicable to
both." Id. at 397. "When we consider this prior art, including [the copending patents]
• ..we are forced to conclude that [the patentee] ... took no inventive step." Id.
(emphasis added).
28. 251 O.G. Pat. Off. 839 (1918). Ex parte Thomas is not mentioned in the Mil-
burn case. Its significance has been recognized relatively recently by commentators. See
Dodds, supra note 17; Roth, supra note 10.
29. The third defense is equated with "anticipation" in the prior art and the fourth
defense with "priority."
30. 251 O.G. Pat. Off. at 840. Compare Lemley v. Dobson-Evans Co., 243 Fed. 391
(6th Cir. 1917). This case is discussed 251 O.G. Pat. Off. at 846-47.
31. 251 O.G. Pat. Off. at 840.
32. Id.; see Levy, Offensive Defensive Patents, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 159 (1957);
Randle, Patent Invalidity: Prior Knowledge as Evidenced by an Unpublished Written
Description, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 97 (1963); Willner, supra note 27.
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ceeds to his rights."3 This theory of public succession to the prior patentee's
rights is intertwined with a contract theory of patents. The patent grant
is the consideration given by the public and the disclosure of the invention
is the consideration given by the inventor. If the public has already suc-
ceeded to the right of a prior inventor who would have been entitled to a
patent had he claimed the invention, it would receive no consideration for
a patent grant to a later applicant. 4
3. The Milburn Case
The present law of the competence of copending patents is based, to an
extent which will become apparent, on the landmark decision of Alexander
Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co." This was a patent infringement
suit on a patent to one Whitford. The defendant gave notice of the de-
fense of prior invention, and produced patents to Clifford and to Reich.
These were both copending patents, the former issued prior to Whitford's
patent and the latter after Whitford's patent."' Each described the invention
claimed in the patent in suit, but neither claimed it. The case was tried
in the district court before Judge Learned Hand. The court held that
neither of the copending patents invalidated the patent in suit; their failure
to point out or claim the invention prevented either from being used as
proof of prior inventorship3
33. 251 O.G. Pat. Off. at 840-42.
34. Id. at 841-42. The rest of the decision is devoted to a discussion of prior cases.
Sundh is treated as not necessarily based on the fact that the identical invention was
claimed, but rather as probably based on identity of disclosure. Id. at 846. Lemley's
failure to distinguish between the third and fourth defenses is rejected. Id. at 846-47.
The rules adopted by the decision are summarized (at 848-49), and the ultimate test
adopted is whether the invention claimed in the application in suit has any "material
and substantial" limitations which distinguish it from the invention disclosed in the
copending patent.
35. 270 U.S. 390 (1926), rev'g 1 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), which had affirmed 297 Fed.
846 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). A summary of the decision in each court is found in Johnson,
supra note 10.
36. In other words, Clifford was a prior-issued copending patent and Reich was a
later-issued copending patent.
37. 297 Fed. at 851-55. Hand's opinion treats § 4920, note 13 supra, as a mere mat-
ter of pleading in an infringement suit and, relying on the "Inventions Patentable" sec-
tion of the statute, Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692, as amended, ch. 450,
§ 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (1939), treats an "invention" as anything "new" in an absolute
sense. Without getting into the question of "constructive reduction to practice," it con-
siders "invention" to be the act of pointing out the particular combination of elements
which is new and useful. The only reason a publication which does not point out the
combination is a bar is that the combination is thereby dedicated to the public. The
opinion suggests that the considerations in comparing claims of copending applications
are similar to those in double patenting. See note 7 supra.
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The Court of Appeals, affirming the finding of validity of the patent
in suit, considered only the Clifford (prior-issued) patent."
The Supreme Court also considered only the prior-issued Clifford patent
and reversed the judgment of the lower courts."0 Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered a terse opinion for a unanimous Court.4" The opinion disposed
of the argument relied on by the lower courts by saying:
The question is not whether Clifford showed himself by the descrip-
tion to be the first inventor .... The question is whether Clifford's
disclosure made it impossible for Whitford to claim the invention at
a later date .... It is not necessary to show who did invent the thing
in order to show that Whitford did not.4
The Court found the natural meaning of the statutory fourth defense to
be that one must really be the first inventor to obtain a patent. Certain
exceptions to this natural meaning are allowed "in view of the gain to
the public that the patent laws mean to secure." 2
The Court then attacked the problem from a different angle, that of the
third defense:
On the other hand publication in a periodical is a bar. This as it
seems to us is more than an arbitrary enactment, and illustrates, as
does the rule concerning previous public use, the principle that, sub-
ject to the exceptions mentioned, one really must be the first inventor
in order to be entitled to a patent.4
Since publication is a bar because it shows the patentee is not the first in-
ventor,
38. The opinion of the Court of Appeals treats the problem in similar fashion. It
does rely on the third and fourth defenses. The third defense did not apply on the basis
of Sundh. The fourth defense failed because Clifford's failure to claim the invention
indicated that he had not completed even the first step of invention, formulation of the
concept. Thus, the court had no need to discuss reduction to practice. The test applied
by the court was whether the prior applicant "was entitled to the first patent." 1 F.2d at
232.
39. 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
40. The reasoning of this opinion has never been completely explained by commen-
tators or the courts. To quote Thomas Mann (describing Death in Venice), it "is indeed
a crystallization in the true sense of the word; it is a structure and an image, . ..by
its nature of such inexhaustible allusiveness, that it might well dazzle the eyes of its
creator himself as it took shape." MANN, STORIES OF THREE DEcADES viii (1955).
41. 270 U.S. at 401.
42. Id. at 400. Three exceptions are noted: a description not communicated to any-
one, an abandoned patent application (because of Patent Office procedure), and foreign
inventions not patented or described in a printed publication.
43. Id. at 400.
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the delays of the Patent Office ought not to cut down the effect of
what has been done .... Clifford had done all that he could do to
make his description public .... We see no reason in the words or
policy of the law for allowing Whitford to profit by the delay and
make himself out to be the first inventor when he was not so in fact,
when Clifford had shown knowledge inconsistent with the allowance
of Whitford's claim . . .and when otherwise the publication of his
patent would abandon the thing described to the public unless it al-
ready was old . . ..
The Court's finding that the basic rule underlying both the third and
fourth defenses is that the patentee must be the first inventor implicitly de-
pends on the reasoning in Lemley that there is really no difference between
the defenses of prior invention and prior publication. It is possible that
the Court failed completely to distinguish between "invention" as con-
ception and an "invention" as a completed invention, reduced to practice."
The Court might also have intended to indicate that publication was a
constructive reduction to practice or that a description in a patent ap-
plication is an exception to the rule that a mere description is not a con-
structive reduction to practice."'
None of these possible rationales of the Court's position seems to fit very
well with the apparent reason for making publication a bar, which is that
publication of the conception of an invention dedicates that conception
to the public (if no one in a position to claim the invention in a patent
at the time of the publication does so within the statutory period). There-
fore, no one who conceives an invention after it has been dedicated to the
public can be allowed to claim it in a patent."' Both policies can be rec-
onciled, however, in the following suggested explanation of the Milburn
case. The Court may simply have felt that the policy of the patent system
44. Id. at 401 (citations omitted). The significance given by the Court to the
third defense, as showing the patentee not to be the first inventor, is a key to the Milburn
case.
45. See Orenbuch, Abandoned Applications as Prior Art, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'v 613
(1963).
46. See Randle, supra note 32; Stringham, "Copending" Patents as Reference, 8 J.
PAT. OFF,. Soc'y 407 (1926). The Court, however, disposes of the argument that filing
an allowable application is a constructive reduction to practice only of the invention
claimed on two grounds: (1) a patentee can file a new application within the statutory
"time-bar" period, claiming anything disclosed in the original application and be given
the advantage of the filing date of his first application, and (2) "a description that
would bar a patent if printed in a periodical or in an issued patent is equally effective
as far as reduction to practice goes." 270 U.S. at 401-02.
47. Compare Pirri, Does Statutory Basis Exist for Rule 131?, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y
730 (1962).
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was to reward the first person to conceive an invention and take steps to
make it public through the Patent Office.
If the conception of an invention by someone (not necessarily the ap-
plicant) is disclosed in a patent application before a second inventor's con-
ception of the invention, and, in addition, the invention is made public by
the issuance of a patent on the first application while the second to con-
ceive is still trying to make the invention public through the Patent Office,
all of the objectives of the patent system have been met without granting
a patent to the second inventor. Thus, although the precise words of neither
the third nor the fourth defense fit a description of the invention in a co-
pending patent, the Court may have felt that the policy of the patent
system was best upheld by allowing such a description as a defense." If
this policy consideration did lie behind the decision, then the Court's treat-
ment might have been different had it felt any need to discuss the later-
issued Reich patent.
Although implications of the Milburn decision were sweeping, 9 the
problems created in the lower courts, were relatively few. The overriding
concern seemed to be whether copending patents were to be considered
broadly as prior art or limited to showing prior invention."0 Under either
approach, no substantial reason existed for distinguishing a later-issued
copending patent from a prior-issued copending patent. If a copending
patent is prima facie evidence of prior invention of everything disclosed
in the application, the date of its issue is immaterial."' Likewise, if a
48. See also Oisher & Steinhauser, The Role of the Prior Inventor Under § 102(g),
29 BROOKLYN L. REv. 196 (1963), 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 595 (1963).
49. See, e.g., Stringham, supra note 46.
50. See generally Dodds, supra note 17; Riordan, Copending Patents, 21 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 444 (1939). Some cases subsequent to the Dodds article are listed in Woodcock,
What is Prior Art?, 3 VILL. L. REv. 255, 297 n.132 (1958). Two obvious approaches to
the question were taken by the courts. One group of courts held that the Milburn de-
cision on its facts and in its reasoning was concerned only with priority of invention (the
fourth defense). See Dobbs, supra note 17. Others found in Holmes' reasoning that "a
sound distinction cannot be taken between disclosure of a published patent and a patent
applied for before but not granted until after a second patent is sought," 270 U.S. at
401, an implication that a patent application which subsequently matures into a patent
is to be treated as a publication from its application date (under the third defense). See
articles cited supra.
51. The courts frequently adopted differing terminologies to distinguish other cases
and reach the results they felt proper. Cf. note 18 supra. The resulting confusion in
terminology makes a breakdown of the cases next to impossible. See Dodds, supra note
17. A single later-issued copending patent seems to have been relied on as showing the
complete invention in some cases. See Permo, Inc. v. Hudson-Ross, Inc., 179 F.2d 386
(7th Cir. 1950); Gasifier Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 138 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.
1943); Federal Yeast Corp. v. Fleischmann Co., 13 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1926), aflirming
8 F.2d 186 (D.C. Md. 1925) (issued same date); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co.
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patent speaks as a publication from its application date, because "the de-
lays of the Patent Office ought not to cut down the effect of what has been
done," 2 the fact that the Patent Office delayed longer in issuing the co-
pending patent than the patent in suit should not matter." Thus, the
cases in this period seem to have held unanimously that a later-issued co-
pending patent was a reference, at least if it disclosed the precise inven-
tion in issue.5
II. THE PATENT ACT OF 1952
1. Section 282(2)
The 1952 Patent Act"5 was enacted "to revise and codify the laws re-
lating to patents and the Patent Office." 6 One of the most striking re-
v. General Elec. Co., 64 U.S.P.Q. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1946); De Cew v. Union Bag & Paper Corp, 59 F. Supp. 323 (D.N.J. 1945) (in-
vention also claimed); Western States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., 51 F. Supp. 859
(E.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 147 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1945) (scmble) (ex-
tended discussion of Milburn by L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945); Gold-
smith Metal Lathe Co. v. Milcor Steel Co., 53 F. Supp. 778 (D. Del. 1943) (not
identical); Maccarone v. Pincus & Tobias, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 248 (E.D.N.Y. 1935), aff'd
per curiam, 82 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1936); Allied Stamping Co. v. Standard Elec. Equip.
Corp., 57 F.2d 296 (E.D.N.Y. 1932).
A later-issued copending patent seems to have been used broadly as "prior art" in
other cases. See Williams Bros. Aircraft Corp. v. Gould-Mersereau Co., 274 U.S. 713
(1927), rev'g 10 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1925) (semble) (other prior-issued copending
patents aso considered); Kendall Co. v. Tetley Tea Co., 189 F.2d 558 (Ist Cir. 1951);
Electrol, Inc. v. Merrell & Co., 39 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1930) (by implication); Osteen
v. Ansco Photoproducts, Inc., 27 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1928); Oswego Falls Corp. v.
American Seal-Kap Corp., 65 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Perry v. United States,
76 F. Supp. 503 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (dictum).
52. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
53. See note 51 supra.
54. Had the courts and litigants not been so preoccupied with the question of the
effect of disclosures in copending patents generally, they might have been willing to
distinguish later-issued from prior-issued copending patents, on an analysis of the Mil-
burn case such as given in text accompanying note 45 supra and the observation that:
So long as knowledge of an invention disclosed in an application is not accessible
to the public the interest of the public is served by the grant of a patent to another
inventor covering that invention, in the same way as if there existed no knowledge
of it by any one other than the patentee. In that case the public receives the nor-
mal valuable consideration for the grant of a patent. For the same reason that
accessibility of knowledge of the invention to the public is essential to the defense
of anticipation it is essential to the defense of prior invention, although in the lat-
ter case it may be effective with reference to a different date. Ex parte Thomas,
251 O.G. Pat. Off. 839, 841 (1918) (dicta) (emphasis added).
This different date could logically be taken to be the date on which the patent in suit
issued. Whether or not courts would have considered later-issued patents differently
before the 1952 statute if urged to do so is a moot question which need not concern us
more.
55. The Patent Act of 1952 revised, codified and enacted into law Title 35 of the
United States Code.
56. From the title of the act. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35
U.S.C.A. at 9 (1954). One of the most perplexing problems posed by the act is to what
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visions was the modification and collection of the former statute's condi-
tions for patentability into a single section, section 102."¢ These condi-
tions for patentability (as well as the condition of non-obviousness con-
tained in section 103) have been incorporated by reference into section
282," s which lists the defenses in an infringement suit.59 Thus, the present
statute provides that the grant of a patent and the validity of the patent
once issued are subject to the same "conditions for patentability." ' The
precise meaning of section 282(2) is subject to question. It could be read
to mean that if at any time prior to the raising of the defense in a par-
ticular suit an event occurs which under the statutory provisions sheds
doubt on the validity of the patent in suit, this event may be pleaded as
if it had occurred prior to the granting of the patent (to show that it
would have been a bar to the granting of the patent had it occurred prior
thereto).1 A second reading of section 282(2) would limit the defensive
material to facts existing at the time the patent was granted, which if
known to the Patent Office would have been a bar to the issuance of the
patent. To understand the importance of determining which interpreta-
tion section 282(2) should be given, we must consider which conditions
for patentability might be negatived by a later-issued patent.
2. Section 102
Of the seven subsections of section 102, three might be considered "prior
art" provisions and four are technical bars based on the applicant's own
conduct." - Only the prior art provisions need concern us here:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country,
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent, or
extent it was meant to revise the law and to what extent it represents merely a codifica-
tion. See Beckett, Judicial Construction of the Patent Act of 1952-Codification v.
Substantive Change, 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 467 (1955).
57. These conditions were listed in a variety of places. See § 102(e) (Reviser's
notes); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), in 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 549,
560 (1952) ; Federico, supra note 56, at 17-19.
58. § 282(2), note 3 supra and accompanying text.
59. The second defense under § 282 is "Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit
on any ground specified in part II of this title as a condition for patentability."
60. See Woodcock, supra note 50, at 255-56.
61. This reading of the statute seems somewhat strained, at best. Nonetheless, in the
cases which allow later-issued patents as references under § 102(e) this must be the inter-
pretation given the statute.
62. §§ 102(b) (failure to file within one year after invention made public), (c)
(abandonment), (d) (foreign patenting), and (f) (non-invention by applicant).
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(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an appli-
cation for patent by another filed in the United States before the in-
vention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was
made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction
to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one
who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time
prior to conception by the other.
a. subsection (a). Section 102(a) cannot be met by a later-issued
patent. 3 To be a bar, knowledge or use of the invention must be availa-
ble to the public before its invention by the patentee of the patent in suit.
This restriction on subsection (a) was noted at the time the Act was
passed." Therefore, the existence of a secret patent application at the
time the patentee made his invention, even one which becomes a patent
and fully describes and claims the invention, cannot be used to show that
the invention was "known or used by others" under subsection (a).
b. subsection (e). Section 102(e) codifies the "rule" of the Milburn
case. It is unique in section 102 because it has no prior statutory basis. Be-
cause Milburn was decided under the statute then in force,"6 its emergence
as an entirely separate bar poses a problem.
Some courts tend to treat section 102(e) as if it were merely a definition
of one of the other subsections of section 102, just as the lower federal
courts used the Milburn decision as a definition of either the third or the
fourth defense under the old statute.66 It is clear, however, that subsec-
tion (e) is an independent test which applies to different situations than
those covered in subsections (a) and (g). Subsection (e) does not require
that knowledge of the invention be available to the public, as does sub-
section (a). Neither does it require proof of the actual inventor, as does
subsection (g). It is met merely by a description of the invention in ques-
tion in another patent. To use subsection (e) as a qualification of the
language of (a) or (g) would render meaningless a part of the statute, con-
63. A later-issued patent could, of course, be useful to a defendant as an indication
that the patentee might have used or made public the invention.
64. § 102 (Reviser's notes); see Woodcock, supra note 50, at 259-68. But see Randle,
supra note 32. Patent applications are kept secret by the Patent Office under a statutory
provision (§122). Therefore, a later-issued patent, by itself, could not constitute proof
of prior use or knowledge.
65. See note 13 supra; notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text.
66. E.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 307 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1962);
John Blue Co. v. Dempster Mill Mfg. Co., 275 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1960).
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travening the purpose of the legislators to present a coherent system for rul-
ing on patent applications.
The Milburn case itself did not consider the effect of a later-issued patent,
although it might have done so."7 Section 102(e) probably applies to later-
issued patents if section 282(2) is interpreted as allowing any fact occur-
ring subsequent to the granting of the patent in suit to be treated as de-
fensive matter as if it had occurred prior to the issuance.6" If section
282(2) is interpreted as being limited to the defense that the patent should
not have issued in the first place, section 102(e) cannot apply to later-
issued patents because the invention was not "described in a patent
granted" 9 at the time of issuance.
c. subsection (g). Besides being the basis for modem interference
practice, subsection (g) is a means for invalidating a patent even though
the invention was not publicly known or available at the time the patentee
made his invention."0 In this latter respect it is like subsection (e). In
another respect-the value of a patent as evidence-the two subsections
differ. While a patent is the only evidence which can show nonconformance
with subsection (e), a patent can be used to show nonconformance with
subsection (g) only if the patent on its face shows that the invention was
made in this country, and that it has not been abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed by the inventor. Thus, a copending patent which claims the
invention would be, by itself, a good reference under subsection (g)." If
the patentee cannot rely on any date of invention prior to his application
date, then the reference patent should be a bar (under either interpreta-
tion of section 282(2) ).
A patent which merely discloses the invention in suit cannot be used
as a reference under subsection (g). Although it might be an indication
that the "invention" was made by someone before the patentee, it is not
necessarily evidence that the invention was made by the applicant, by
67. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
68. There is still a question. To what point in time does the phase "was described
in a patent" refer? In other sections, the past tense is used because the event which acts
as a bar must occur before either the invention or application by the patentee of the
patent in suit.
69. § 102(e).
70. See Oisher and Steinhauser, supra note 48. This article suggests that § 102(a) is
available only when the invention has been made public before the invention is made by
the patentee, whereas § 102(g) should be available whenever the invention has previ-
ously been completed by another "whose activities were such that the invention, although
not yet available to the public when the patentee enters the field, would become so rea-
sonably early in the normal course of events." Id. at 201.
71. This situation is likely to occur only because of oversight by the Patent Office.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss1/8
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
someone "in this country," or by one "who had not abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed it."72
One of the fundamental differences between the treatment here given the
present statute and the Court's treatment of Milburn must be emphasized.
The statute in effect at the time the Milburn decision was handed down
provided as the fourth defense "that he [the patentee] was not the original
and first inventor or discoverer of any material and substantial part of the
thing patented. 73 It mattered not who the true inventor might be. If
section 102(g) is used, it matters greatly who the first inventor was. A
contrary argument might be made that one who has disclosed an invention
in a patent application before the invention thereof by the patentee has
"constructively reduced to practice" the invention and, therefore, is a
prior inventor who has not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. This
argument is especially weak when applied to 102(g), since that subsection
requires certain specific information regarding not just the inventor but
the place of invention and the inventor's conduct following his invention. A
mere disclosure in a patent application is, at best, evidence of inventorship
if no earlier knowledge of the invention can be found. This evidence seems
too weak to form a presumption that all the requirements of 102(g) have
been met.
Under section 102(g), which requires actual invention, it makes no
difference whether a patent is later-issued or prior-issued. Only the appli-
cation date could be relevant to show the date of invention.
3. Section 103
Section 103 was included in the present statute in order to provide a
stabilizing effect on the standard of patentable novelty applied by the
Patent Office and courts. It reads:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the dif-
ferences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having or-
dinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains....
A problem which perplexed the courts until recently was whether the
"prior art" referred to includes only that prior art which was available
-72. Cf. Ellis, Subsequent Inventor's Patent Rights With Regard to an Invention
Previously Made by Another Who Kept It Secret, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 259 (1953);
Gambrell & Herman, The Second Inventor's Patent, The Defense of First Invention, and
Public Policy, 41 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 388 (1959).
73. See note 13 supra.
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to persons having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made or whether it also includes section 102-like material, which was not
publicly available at the time. In 1965, the Supreme Court decided, in
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner,74 that section 102(e)-like references
were prior art under section 103. The Court, quoting Milburn, said,
"The delays of the Patent Office ought not to cut down the effect of what
has been done.... We see no reason in the words or policy of the law
for allowing [the second applicant] to profit by the delay ...",'
If section 282(2) is interpreted to include acts which occur after the
patent in suit issued, so that later-issued copending patents are competent
references under section 102(e), the Hazeltine case seems to establish that
a later-issued copending patent is also part of the prior art and may be
relied upon as a reference under section 103.76
If section 282(2) encompasses only the defense that the patent should
not have been granted, the sole remaining question is whether later-issued
patents may constitute prior art as section 102(g) -like references under
section 103. Since section 102(e)-like references do constitute prior art,
under the Hazeltine case, it is difficult to distinguish section 102(g) -like
references as not prior art.7 The mere fact that such references were not
publicly available at the time the invention was made is not a bar to their
74. 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
75. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255 (1965).
76. This would probably be true despite the clear language of section 103 that "a
patent may not be obtained. .. ."
77. One way to avoid the wholesale incorporation of § 102 into § 103 as "prior art"
is to rdy on the language of § 103 that "a patent may not be obtained though the in-
vention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 . . . ." (em-
phasis added). The legislative history of § 103 indicates that "the prior art" would
have been "that prior art" except for the inconsistency which would have been created
since § 102 refers only to the precise invention. See generally Roth, supra note 10. Thus,
what was intended by "prior art" may have been matter like "the invention" of § 102,
in those subsections which make disclosure or description a bar. These subsections are
§§ (a), (b), and (e). See Application of Foster, 343 F.2d 980 (C.C.P.A. 1965); Appli-
cation of Harry, 333 F.2d 920 (C.C.P.A. 1964). Under this interpretation, a § 102(g)-
like reference could not be prior art.
Because the 1952 Act is to some extent a codification, a different approach could be
taken. "Prior art" could be considered to be without antecedent in the statute and taken
to include that defensive matter which has been designated "prior art" by case law. See
Roth, supra note 10, at 817-18. With this approach, copending patents which apply
under § 102(e) could be combined because of the case law allowing copending patents
as prior art. See note 50 supra. The changes in the statutory scheme of §§ 102 and
282(2), however, cause some difficulties. Under the case law after Milburn but before
the statute, later-issued patents were generally not differentiated from prior-issued patents.
Therefore, any change in this practice must come from the same interpretation of §
282(2) suggested with regard to § 102. If the question is whether the patent should
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being used as prior art under section 103.8 Furthermore, Patent Office
interference practice allows the use of a patent granted on a winning ap-
plication to show that the remaining claims in the losing application are
obvious, even if the earliest applicant loses. Such a rejection can only be
based on the theory that section 102(g)-like references are prior art under
section 103."'
III. OASES FOLLOWING THE PATENT ACT OF 1952
None of the cases since 1952 which have considered the problem of later-
issued patents has discussed it in terms of the statute rather than simply in
terms of the Milburn case. This can probably be accounted for by the
paucity of other situations in which a patent, once validly granted, might
subsequently be invalidated by a later occurrence."0 Furthermore, the
courts have retained the terminology of the old statute, creating confusion
under the present statute.81
have been granted, the later-issued patents disclosing but not claiming material which
makes the invention obvious are not competent defensive material. If such patents also
claim material which makes the invention obvious, then the case law which held that
prior invention must be distinguished from prior art (in that only prior art references
could be combined) would suggest that even those patents could not be considered part
of the prior art. See Ex parte Thomas, 251 O.G. Pat. Off. 839 (1918); notes 28-34 supra
and accompanying text. But see Lemley v. Dobson-Evans Co., 243 Fed. 391 (6th Cir.
1917); note 25 supra and accompanying text; cf. Western States Mach. Co. v. S.S.
Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d 345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945). The serious
drawbacks in using an approach which effectively incorporates the old statutory scheme
are apparent.
78. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
79. Since the later-filed application was by the first inventor, there is no earlier patent
application to serve as a § 102(e) reference. See Application of Gregg, 244 F.2d 316
(C.C.P.A. 1957); Sobel, Prior Art and Obviousness, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 79, 92-96
(1965).
80. Another situation in which a validly granted patent might be invalidated by
someone else's later acts would occur in the following sequence of events:
A conceives the invention.
B conceives the invention.
B applies for a patent.
B obtains a patent.
A, who has been diligent ever since he conceived the invention, either reduces to
practice or files a patent application, within a year of B's patent.
Is B's patent invalid? See Woodcock, supra note 50, at 256-59.
81. In particular, the term "anticipation," which under the old statute was usually
equated with description in the "prior art," see notes 27, 51 supra, is now generally used
in opposition to "prior art." See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 307 F.2d
344 (3d Cir. 1962); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 233 F.2d 148
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 879 (1956) (later-issued copending patent). But
see East Rutherford Syringes, Inc. v. Omega Precision Medical Instrument Co., 152 F.
Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1957). Much of the blame for the resulting confusion (particularly
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Of ten cases which have considered the competence of later-issued co-
pending patents since the present statute was passed, eight have apparently
considered the Milburn case binding precedent for using such patents as
references for all purposes."2 The other two cases each held that a later-
issued copending patent is not part of the prior art (under section 103)
when older cases are cited) lies with the statutory provision, § 282, note 3 supra, that
the defendant must give notice of references to be used "as anticipation" and "as show-
ing the state of the art." Use of these terms was unfortunate. See Roth v. Harris, 168
Fed. 279, 282 (2d Cir. 1909).
82. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 307 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1962)
the court held: "A patent issued on an application antedating the application for the
patent in suit is the equivalent of a printed publication and speaks as of the date of the
application regardless of the date on which the patent issues." Id. at 346. The court
cited cases just prior to the present statute. In United Parts Mfg. Co. v. Lee Motor
Products, Inc., 266 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1959), the patentee proved a date of invention
prior to the application date of a later-issued patent, the "ideas" of which were "quite
synonymous." Id. at 25. It is not clear whether the term "ideas" means the claimed
inventions, but the court indicates that Milburn would have been applicable. Id. at 23.
In Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. E. T. Barwick Mills, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ga. 1963),
aff'd per curiam, 340 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1965), the pat-
ents in suit were held to be "entitled to no presumption of validity over the prior art
relied upon by defendants which was not cited or considered by the Patent Office," in-
cluding a later-issued patent, which had been involved in a Patent Office interference
which the patentees had "declined to join." Id. at 205. In Hazeltine Research, Inc. v.
Dage Elec. Co., 165 F. Supp. 226 (S.D. Ind. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.
1959), the court found that the "Patent Office failed to find the most pertinent prior
art," including particularly a later-issued patent (which, of course, was not part of the
prior art at the time the Patent Office acted), citing Milburn. Id. at 240, 243. In re-
versing, the Court of Appeals found the later-issued patent to be directed toward another
invention and dismissed it without considering its competence as prior art. In Magnex,
Inc. v. Duro Mfg. Co., 159 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1957), the court held: "Under the
rule established by Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390,
46 S.Ct. 324, 70 L.Ed. 651, which rule is now codified as part of the Patent Statute
(Section 102(e), Patent Codification Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(e)), the earliest
filed of two copending applications is prior art against the later filed even though the
later filed may have been first to issue." Id. at 325. In Berghane v. RCA, 116 F.
Supp. 200 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1954), the court decided that
the (later-issued) reference patent was prior art against the patent in suit because it
was filed before the patent in suit, without citing any authority at all. The Court of
Appeals reached the same result, also without citing any authority.
Two cases involved patents which were issued on the same day to different inventors,
but which were owned by the same person. (The cases involved the same set of
patents.) In both Lorenz v. Berkline Corp., 215 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ill. 1963), and
General Steel Prods. Co. v. Lorenz, 204 F. Supp. 518 (S.D. Fla. 1962), aff'd, 337 F.2d
726 (5th Cir. 1964), the second patent applied for was held invalid over the one
earlier applied for under §§ 102 (a), (e), (f), and (g). In the latter case, Milburn
was cited and the reason given for the multiple grounds was that the earlier application
"established invention" by that inventor of "the subject matter disclosed" in that
application. Id. at 530.
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because it was granted subsequent to the issuance of the patent in suit. 3
These opinions seem to indicate that, had the reference patents disclosed
the inventions claimed by the patents in suit, they still would not have been
competent references.8 4
Two other cases, while dealing with prior-issued copending patents,
contain dicta which indicate that the courts might treat later-issued patents
differently, at least when they are sought to be used as prior art."s
83. In Langdon v. Saltser & Weinsier, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1959),
aff'd, 288 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1961), the court failed to mention Milburn at all. Instead,
it cited Sundh Elec. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 198 Fed. 94 (2d Cir.
1912), discussed in notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text, in holding that although
the later-issued reference patent disclosed and claimed a similar invention, since it
"was granted subsequent to the original patent in suit, albeit on a prior application, it
should not in any event, be viewed as a part of the prior art." Id. at 100. The court
held the patent valid and not infringed. On appeal, it was declared invalid on other
grounds. In East Rutherford Syringes, Inc. v. Omega Precision Medical Instrument
Co., 152 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1957), the defendant listed several later-issued patents "in
the brochure of prior art references." Id. at 501. The court refused to consider these
patents (although it found the patent invalid on other grounds):
These patents may not be regarded as anticipatory; while it is true they issued on
applications filed earlier than the application on which the patent in suit issued,
the cited patents issued after the patent in suit issued. It is well established that
a patent speaks as an anticipation from the date of its issue and not from the
date of the application. [Citations omitted.] The case of Alexander Milburn Co.
v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 46 S. Ct. 324, 70 L. Ed. 651, cited by
the defendants, is not applicable. There the issue was priority of invention; it
was interposed by way of defense that the patentee was not the original and first
inventor. The references were clearly relevant in that case. Id. at 501-02.
84. The direct holding of Sundh Elec. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 198
Fed. 94 (2d Cir. 1912), relied on in Langdon v. Saltzer & Weinsier, Inc., 175 F.
Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 288 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1961), was that where a
later-issued copending patent discloses and claims the same invention it is a bar. See
note 24 supra and accompanying text. There is no indication of what the court would
do with a later-issued copending patent which disclosed but did not claim the invention
claimed by the patent in suit. In East Rutherford Syringes, Inc. v. Omega Precision
Instrument Co., 152 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1957), the court's distinction between antici-
pation (apparently in the sense of prior art, see note 81 supra and accompanying text)
and priority of invention could no longer be made. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v.
Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965). Since the court's analysis that "a patent speaks as an
anticipation from the date of its issue and not from the date of the application," 152 F.
Supp. at 501, does not really support its distinguishing later-issued patents from
prior-issued copending patents (because the patentee of the patent in suit can always
rely on his application date), it is possible that this court would still be willing to give
special treatment to later-issued copending patents on some other ground.
85. Messing v. Quiltmaster Corp., 162 F. Supp 489 (D.N.J. 1958), a case involving
only prior-issued copending patents, decided by the same court that decided East
Rutherford Syringes, Inc. v. Omega Precision Medical Instrument Co., 152 F. Supp.
497 (D.N.J. 1957), concludes that:
the claims of [the patent in suit] . . . (if they disclose any differences between the
subject matter thereof and the prior art) embody methods and products which
would have been obvious at the time the patent was issued to a person having
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IV. CRITIQUE
Section 282(2) makes the above discussed tests for patentability de-
fenses in patent infringement suits. Except for later-issued copending
patents claiming the invention in dispute, which are clearly references under
10 2 (g), the question of whether later-issued copending patents represent
prior art depends upon which interpretation of section 282(2) is adopted.
It is suggested that both the statutory language and the relevant policy con-
siderations weigh in favor of interpreting section 282 (2) as being limited to
those acts occurring before the issuance of the patent in suit.
This interpretation seems to fit the plain meaning of the statute. The
defense under section 282(2) is "invalidity of the patent or any claim in
suit on any ground specified in Part II of this title as a condition for pat-
entability." Part II is entitled "Patentability of Inventions and Grant of
Patents." Section 282(2) appears to refer only to sections 102 and 103,"8
which list under the heading "Conditions for Patentability" the conditions
under which a patent may be granted.7 Thus, there is support in the
language of the statute itself for reading 282(2) to mean "any ground
specified in Part II as a condition for granting a patent."
Section 102(e) is a codification of the Milburn decision. That case did
not discuss the effect of later-issued copending patents, but its present sta-
tutory setting, discussed above, seem to limit its application to prior-issued
patents. It can be argued, however, that the language of the Milburn
case was sufficiently broad to apply to later-issued as well as prior-issued
patents. As has been pointed out, the decision can be explained on a policy
basis which would not apply to a later-issued copending patent."8 At the
time the patent in suit issued, not only had the invention previously been
ordinary skill in the art to which these claims relate. Id. at 492 (emphasis added)
(alternative holding).
Since this language has no basis in the statute, it must either be a slip or be based on
some such analysis of the statute as presented here. See notes 98-99 infra and accom-
panying text. Dictum in the case of S.W. Farber, Inc. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 230
F. Supp. 883 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 957 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
843 (1965) indicates that this court also might be willing to imply the additional
requirement that the disclosure of a copending patent be available to the public at
the time the patent in suit issues for such a patent to be prior art:
Prior to December 2, 1954, when Foster [the patentee of the patent in suit]
completed his invention, the Burch thermal actuator disclosed in Burch's applica-
tion filed on March 31, 1954, was part of the prior art, since Burch's application
antedated Foster's, and Burch's patent was issued prior to Foster's 230 patent. Id.
at 889 (emphasis added).
86. "§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent."
"§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter."
87. See Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. at 10 (1954).
88. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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made, but it also had been made public. Therefore, the public had not
really received anything for the patent grant. Since the patentee was not
the first inventor, and since the subject matter had been made public by
the issuance of the copending patent before his patent issued, the Court
was not really concerned with who the first inventor in fact was. Under
the view taken in this discussion, neither of the two factors taken alone
should be sufficient. Where the actual first inventor is shown, his rights
may outweigh those of the patentee. If the actual first inventor is not
shown, for the purpose of invalidation under subsection (g), the mere
possibility that the invention might become available to the public from an
independent source after the patent in suit is granted should not bar its
issuance. If the possibility has become a fact, that fact should not invali-
date a patent which was valid at the time it was granted.
There is no real injustice in this result. If the applicant for the co-
pending patent was in fact a prior inventor of the subject matter, he could
have added claims to his pending application, whether or not the patent
in suit had yet issued.89 The issuance of a patent constitutes constructive
notice to the world of the invention. 0 If, after the patent in suit had been
issued, the applicant for the copending patent still failed to claim his in-
vention, he must be deemed to have waived the protection to which a
first inventor is usually entitled."' The public, in fact, would have benefited
if he chose not to claim the invention, because the invention would be-
come public property earlier, albeit not as early as if the patent in suit
had not issued. The public would benefit from the patent in suit by re-
ceiving an earlier disclosure of the invention. If, on the other hand, the
first applicant did not make the invention, the policy favoring the first
inventor does not apply and there is no reason to invalidate the patent in
suit.92
89. This is true even though the patent might be later-issued because the patentee
was in fact the first inventor. Section 102(g) would protect him.
90. Publication of a patent gives notice to the world of the invention and the
patentee's claim. If the prior applicant did in fact make the invention this will con-
stitute a defense for him or for anyone else. Furthermore, although his patent is not
per se a valid reference, it is evidence that he did not abandon, suppress, or conceal
the invention. See Gambrell & Herman, supra note 72; Oisher & Steinhauser, supra note
48; notes 63, 70 supra.
91. If the copending patent issues prior to the patent in suit, all inventions which
are disclosed but not claimed are of course dedicated to the public. Therefore under
either § 102(a) or § 102(e) the patent in suit would be invalid.
92. The reasons for favoring the first inventor in fact over a later independent
inventor who was the first to take steps to disclose the invention are obscure. When
the identity of the first inventor is not known, and thus there is no personal interest to
protect, the basic policy of the patent system is to reward an inventor who makes his
invention known to the public.
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This treatment of later-issued copending patents has other, more fun-
damental, justifications. It encourages the earliest possible disclosure of
inventions to the public, and it strengthens the patent system. The former
is encouraged in two ways. First, inventors who file patent applications
for their inventions will be more likely to make a prompt disclosure to the
public of the invention in the form of an embodiment of the invention.
Since a feature of an "invention" shown but not claimed in a patent is
almost of necessity simply an incidental feature of an embodiment of the
claimed invention, actual disclosure to the public of the embodiment Vill
serve the double purpose of allowing the public to use and improve on
these incidental features and preventing any later inventor who perceives
some genus of which these features happen to form one embodiment from
appropriating to himself, by patent, a monopoly on such genus. Further-
more, although the speed with which an application is passed upon by
the Patent Office is largely out of the hands of the applicant, a system
which places some premium, however slight, on the early issuance of
patents will tend to prevent prolonging the prosecution of patent applica-
tions by applicants.
The interpretation of section 282(2) suggested here would also
strengthen the patent system by increasing the patentee's certainty that
if he has made a careful search of the relevant art up to the time his
patent issued, his patent will be held valid.
The significance of an applicant's letting his application mature into
a patent has not been afforded due recognition. An inventor (or his as-
signee) may for a variety of reasons want to file a patent application on
his invention even though he is not sure at the time that he ever wants to
get a patent. If, for example, at the time his application is found allowable
by the Patent Office he has successfully kept his invention a trade secret,
he may decide that the law of trade secrets will protect him better than
a patent. However, if a thorough search of the pertinent literature has
failed to disclose anything likely to invalidate the patent, the applicant
may feel that a patent offers better protection. One of the basic tenets of
the patent system is that the public is better served by the latter course of
action than by the former.93 If the courts adopt the position that a patent
may be invalidated by a disclosure made in a later-issued patent, an in-
ventor may well decide to take the chance that his rivals will be able to
duplicate his invention on the basis of a mere disclosure in a later-issued
patent without the benefit of any disclosure by him, rather than risk a
court holding that such a disclosure in a later-issued patent destroys his
93. See Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HAxv. L. Rv. 369 (1959).
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patent monopoly."4 An inventor, in making his choice, would of course
recognize that his secret might fall into his rival's hands through many
other sources than later-issued copending patents, and that the odds are
that no copending application discloses his invention (or a reasonable
equivalent thereof).9- Nevertheless, if such an application exists and sub-
sequently matures into a patent, his patent is indeed in jeopardy if a court
adopts a view contrary to that suggested here and allows a later-issued
patent to be used as defensive matter not only for what it claims but for
what it discloses. If a court allows the patent as a reference, it is very likely
to hold that since this reference was not considered by the Patent Office
in granting the patent in suit, the presumption of validity attaching to that
grant is seriously weakened, if not destroyed." This interpretation would
bring about the anomalous situation in which the earlier-issued patent
could in fact be valid at the time it issued (in the sense that even if all the
then existing facts were known, no bar to the grant of the patent would
exist) and yet become invalid thereafter. 7
The use, under section 103, of later-issued 102(e)-like references will
depend upon which interpretation of section 282(2) is adopted. The
question of whether later-issued 102(g)-like references can be used as
prior art, although not affected by how section 282(2) is interpreted, can
be answered by a consideration of the policies involved. The policy con-
sideration favoring the first inventor is better satisfied by allowing a later-
issued copending patent to be considered part of the prior art under
94. See also Roth, supra note 77, at 824-25. The chances that his rivals would
discover his invention or would be able to practice it as effectively on the basis merely
of a disclosure in another patent are lessened further by the fact that the disclosure
is very likely not to be of a very good embodiment of his invention. Such a disclosure
would still invalidate his patent. The information which he must disclose to the public
in his patent, on the other hand, must be "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." § 112.
95. To the extent that another inventor, by filing an application claiming all or
part of the invention, has tried to make his invention public, although he has not yet
done so when the patent in suit issues, and can invalidate the patent in suit, the policy
favoring early disclosure is contravened in favor of the prior inventor. See also Note,
Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 369, 378-81 (1959). To this extent,
the use of the patent system for disclosing inventions is encouraged by adopting, in
this case, the rule that "the delays of the Patent Olfice ought not to cut down the
effect of what has been done." Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co.,
270 U.S. 390, 401 (1926).
96. See, e.g., Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Dage Elec. Co., 165 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.
Ind. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 218 (1959) (without consideration of the point).
97. See generally Rosenberg, Double Patenting, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soa'y 34, 48-50
(1963).
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section 103. If the invention claimed in the copending patent, when taken
with other references, makes the invention claimed in the patent in suit
obvious, the first inventor (as well as the rest of the public) has been
deprived of the right to make, use, or sell something which would have
been obvious in view of his own invention.
Nonetheless, the policy of benefiting the public by early disclosure and
the policy of benefiting the patent system by increasing the probability
that no previously secret bars will appear after a patent issues,"8 are
best served by a rule that any reference, to constitute "prior art," must
have been available to the public at the time the patent in suit issued.
Such a rule would allow some section 102(g)-like references to be con-
sidered prior art, but only those references which had become public at
the time the patent in suit issued. 9
CONCLUSION
The present statute has done away with the "fundamental rule" ex-
pressed in the Milburn case that "the patentee must be the first inventor"
and has substituted section 102(g), making certain prior inventions a
bar, and section 102(e), codifying the decision reached by Mr. Justice
Holmes. The cases following Milburn, on the basis of that decision and in
light of the statute then in effect, applied its holding to later-issued as well
as prior-issued copending patents. The cases following the passage of the
present statute have failed to take into account the changes which that
statute made in the law, and have followed older cases. The changes in the
present statute seem to be substantive, and seem to promote the purposes of
the patent system. A closer examination of the statute by the courts is in
order.
For the reasons discussed in this note, later-issued patents to the same
inventor may not invalidate the patent in suit. A later-issued copending
patent which describes but does not claim the invention claimed by the
patent in suit should never invalidate the patent in suit, even if it is to a
different inventor.
A later-issued copending patent to another inventor which claims the
invention of the patent in suit should always invalidate the patent in suit,
unless the patentee of the patent in suit can rely on an earlier date of inven-
tion. If it claims an invention which merely makes the invention of the
98. See Roth, supra note 77, at 825: "The cards would all be on the table."
99. Such a rule could be engrafted onto § 103 by adding a provision similar to
§ 102 (a) after the first sentence: ". . and if the invention has become known or has
been used by others in this country, or has been patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country."
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patent in suit obvious (and the patentees are truly independent), the
policy favoring early disclosure of inventions and the contract theory of
patents both suggest that the patentee has benefited the public by putting
into its possession an invention not then available to it, and should be en-
titled to a patent. Countervailing these policies are the rights of the earlier
"inventor" and the feeling that the delays of the Patent Office should be
disregarded. The interest of a patentee of a later-issued copending patent
in producing items which are obvious changes in his invention makes it
unlikely that the first patentee will prevail when his patent is in suit.
An analysis of the present statute points up both its consistent policy
of encouraging the disclosure of inventions rather than merely rewarding
the first inventor, and the complexities involved in applying that policy. It
is apparent that a patent system which allowed the immediate publication
of applications by the Patent Office would expedite the policy of making
inventions available at the earliest possible date by reducing or eliminating
long-term concealment of applications pending in the Patent Office. Such
a change could be engrafted onto the present statute without substantial
difficulty. An amendment need only provide for either compulsory or op-
tional publication of all applications by the Patent Office when filed or
at any time thereafter. Bills of this type are currently being considered."'
An amendment of this nature would solve several problems at once. It
would decrease the burden on the Patent Office in examining thoroughly
applications whose only purpose is to provide "defensive patents" which
will prevent others from later patenting the same thing.1 Insofar as it
encouraged defensive applications, such an amendment would tend to make
the files of the Patent Office a more reliable source for finding the prior art.
An early-publication statute would also solve most of the problems dis-
cussed in this note. Compulsory publication by the Patent Office of all
applications would completely do away with the need for section 102(e).
A significant feature of an optional publication amendment could be the
retention of section 122 (which provides for the secrecy of applications
unless the applicant gives authority to reveal the contents of his application)
100. For several years, bills of this type have been before Congress. E.g., H.R.
3561, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). An even more drastic modification of the present
system has been widely advocated in this country. This is a type of system of provisional
patents, with intervention provisions, based on the recently adopted Dutch Law. For a
discussion of this proposal see, e.g., Duncan, The European Patent Convention as a Guide
to Modernizing Our Patent Examination System, 8 IDEA 405 (1964), in 47 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 220 (1965); March 1965 BULL. A.P.L.A. 121.
101. See generally Levy, Offensive Defensive Applications, 39 J. PAT. OrF. Soo'y
159 (1957).
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and the deletion of section 102(e) as to future applications. Such an
amendment would strengthen issued patents by reducing the chance that
they might be invalidated by later-issued patents, would obviate the need
for the fiction that an application ever "discloses" the invention as of the
date filed, and would at last reduce to practice Mr. Justice Holmes' con-
cept that an applicant, by filing his application, has "done all that he
could do to make his description public."10 2
102. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 401 (1926).
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